Mar 12

Mar 12 David Holloway’s “STALIN AND THE BOMB”

Cold War, History, Nuclear, Physics, War

While author Holloway tries in the final pages to come away with a sense of hope given that the West and the Soviet Union did emerge intact from the Cold War after the death of Stalin, it is impossible to read this book without emerging with a sense of unease given how closely we came to World War III.

As recounted in this book, Stalin’s brutality and paranoia, especially in his later years, were reflected in the Soviet Union's devotion of massive industrial and scientific resources to the creation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Especially intriguing is the back and forth between the USSR and the US in development and deployment of the hydrogen bomb. Holloway fairly points out there was significant paranoia and mistrust on both sides.

One thing that Holloway clearly details is the complex relationship between delivery capability and warhead size and volume. The US in the 1950s had the advantage in delivery capabilities (e.g., with the introduction of the B-47 and B-52) and the number of warheads. In Holloway’s telling, this advantage suggested to some in the West (but not necessarily to Truman) that a “first strike” might be the way to go in a war with the Soviet Union.

Also described: experiments on both sides with the battlefield use of the “tactical” nuclear weapons. Reading about the Soviet field experiments with tactical nuclear weapons--with leaders of other communist powers looking on--can't help but bring to mind what a smoking ruin Europe would have been had a “hot” war between the West and the USSR actually broken out.

Stalin's death did lead to a partial pullback of tensions on the part of the Soviets. One reason for this was recognition by some in the USSR that more resources should be devoted to domestic development and consumption rather than the military.

Holloway does an admirable job pulling together details of how communist philosophy and governmental structure influenced nuclear weapons development. While ome might argue that Stalin and his paranoia were primarily responsible for driving Cold War tension, keep in mind Russia's perspective on having been invaded by both France and Germany. Can you blame Russians for their mistrust of the West?

The author provides less clarity in how Stalin's relationship with China may have also impacted his views of how closely to trust China's communist efforts. He saw the benefit of cautiously aligning with Communist China and its efforts against the West in Korea. He also saw that military resources devoted to a war in Asia would not be available to a war in Europe. This may have been another Russian reason to focus on nuclear weapons and their higher efficiency and destructive power. (Thoughts of a land war in Europe are haunting and even today must be considered by NATO as it observes Putin's aggression in the Ukraine.)

Finally, praise is due the author for detailing the scientific efforts of Russian scientists, especially given their having been cut off from most communication with their western colleagues in the early 1940s. One thing I found interesting was the complex interplay between an understanding of fission processes, the need for raw material and refined Uranium 235, and questions of how to actually mine, refine, and manufacture the needed bomb components. Unlike their copying the Western design of atomic bombs, the rapid and more independent development of thermonuclear weapons by the Russians (and the means to deliver them; see Chertok) gave a real wake up call to the West of Soviet capabilities.